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The Legitimacy of the Juridical:
Constituent Power, Democracy, and the
Limits of Constitutional Reform
JOEL COLON-RIOS*
This article asks and answers the question of what conditions must be met for a constitutional regime to enjoy democratic legitimacy. It argues that the democratic legitimacy of a
constitutional regime depends on its susceptibility to democratic re-constitution. In other
words, it argues that a constitution must provide an opening, a means of egress for constituent power to manifest from time to time. In developing this argument, the article advances a distinction between ordinary constitutional reform-understood as subject to
certain timits-and the exercise of constituent power through which a society produces
novel juridical forms without being subject to positive law.
Cet article pose la question et y r6pond, a savoir les conditions qui doivent 6tre satisfaites
pour permettre a un regime constitutionnel de b6n6ficier de [a 16gitimit6 d6mocratique.
L'article pr6tend que [a tegitimit6 dbmocratique d un r6gime constitutionnel d6pend de sa
susceptibilit6 relative a la nouvelle constitution d6mocratique. Autrement dit, it fait valoir
qu une constitution doit procurer une ouverture et un moyen de sortie, afin que le pouvoir
des constituants puisse se manifester de temps 6 autre. En 6aborant cet argument,
['article procure une distinction entre [a reforme constitutionnette ordinaire qui est assujettie certaines Limites, et L'exercice du pouvoir des constituants par un episode de participation populaire intense au cours desquels une societ6 6tablit ces nouvelles formes
juridiques sans 6tre assujettie au droit positif.
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NOT ALL CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES emerge out of highly democratic constitution-making episodes. In fact, many countries that enjoy a reasonable degree of
democratic governance frequently operate under constitutions adopted by state
officials and with little or no participation from ordinary citizens.' Other countries suffer from a different problem: they operate under constitutions that were
imposed from the outside, even if drafted by an elected constituent assembly
and ratified in a referendum. 2 Can constitutional regimes like these, adopted from
the top down or characterized by a dubious democratic pedigree, ever enjoy democratic legitimacy? This article will argue that the fact that a constitutional
regime originates from a non-democratic constitution-making episode does not
necessarily mean it is (or always will be) illegitimate from a democratic perspective. Its claim to democratic legitimacy might lie in the fact that, although it

1.

The case of Canada in 1982 is telling in this respect. Canada-a wealthy, democratic
country-engaged in important constitutional transformations through a process that was
driven from the top down and in which the participation of citizens was limited to
occasional consultation in committees that lacked decision-making power. See generally
Peter H. Russell, ConstitutionalOdyssey: Can CanadiansBecome a Sovereign People?,3d ed.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) [Russell, ConstitutionalOdyssey].

2.

An example of this kind is Puerto Rico's Constitution, adopted through an elected
"constituent assembly" and ratified in a series of referendums after its content had been
limited by the US Congress. See generally Jos6 Trias Monge, Historia Constitucionalde
Puerto Rico, vol. 3 (Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1982). One of
the most recent examples of a constitution imposed from the outside but adopted through
formal "democratic" procedures is that of Iraq. See Andrew Arato, ConstitutionMaking
Under Occupation: The Politics ofimposed Revolution in Iraq (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009). See also Noah Feldman, "Imposed Constitutionalism" (2005) 37
Conn. L. Rev. 857.
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was adopted in an undemocratic way (say, by a group of well-intentioned jurists),
it can be re-constituted democratically. Accordingly, this article will examine
what it means for a constitutional regime to be susceptible to democratic reconstitution. In other words, it will ask and answer the question of what conditions
must be met for a constitutional regime to enjoy democratic legitimacy. In so
doing, the article will advance a distinction between ordinary constitutional reform-understood as subject to certain limits-and the exercise of constituent
power through which a society produces novel juridical forms without being
subject to positive law.
To achieve this objective, the article must do three different things. First, it
must provide an account of what is meant by democratic legitimacy, an idea used
by many authors in ways that differ from the way it is used here. The conception of democratic legitimacy defended in this article is highly procedural and is
connected in important ways to the concept of constituent power.3 It is different, for example, from both the "sociological" and "philosophical" conceptions
of legitimacy. As suggested above, this article maintains that, in the context of
constitutional regimes, democratic legitimacy depends on one basic condition:
a constitutional regime must be susceptible to democratic re-constitution. This
means that in addition to recognizing basic rights of political participation, it
must have some institutional mechanism(s) in place designed to allow citizens'
to trigger, deliberate, and decide on fundamental constitutional changes; it must
have an outlet for constituent power to manifest when important constitutional
transformations are needed. The conception of democracy on which this account
of legitimacy rests requires that citizens be allowed to become authors of their
constitution, even if they were not so when the constitution was originally created. Moreover, it sees the exercise of constituent power as a manifestation of
democracy at the level of a society's fundamental laws and as not being exhausted
in a constitution-making episode.
Second, the article must consider the implications of this conception of
democratic legitimacy for the very institution of constitutional reform. The
democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime, after all, depends on the ways
in which it approaches constitutional reform and the opportunities it provides

3.

The theory of constituent power will be discussed in Part I, below.

4.

The term "citizen" is used broadly here to include those who live under a constitutional
regime and who should therefore be allowed to participate in its re-constitution.
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for popular participation in constitutional change. However, if it were necessary
for every constitutional change to be made through extraordinary and highly
participatory procedures, the approach to democratic legitimacy presented here
would hardly have any practical applications. Constitutions sometimes need to
be changed in order to correct a small defect or to replace or alter a provision
that has become anachronistic.' A system in which all amendments have to be
adopted through a process that involves intense levels of popular participation is
neither practical nor desirable. The solution, however, cannot be found in the
opposite extreme-that is, a system in which legislative supermajorities (like in
Canada. or the United States) can make any constitutional change whatsoever,
and in which the participation of the citizenry is minimal or non-existent. The
solution to this problem, in my view, involves a distinction between ordinary
and fundamental amendments, each of them requiring a different set of procedures and only the latter involving the exercise of constituent power.
Third, the article must give examples of mechanisms that would make democratic constitutional change possible. A constitutional regime in which one
or more of these mechanisms is present would be susceptible to democratic reconstitution and could be considered legitimate from a democratic perspective.'
The specific mechanisms I consider are the constituent assembly convened by
the legislature and the constituent assembly convened "from below."' While
authorized by the constitutional text and therefore not necessarily equivalent to
a revolution in the legal sense, if convened in a context of heightened political
mobilization, these mechanisms can amount to an exercise of constituent
power; they can serve as a channel to a democratic force that cannot manifest
itself through ordinary juridical means. Moreover, the second modality of the

5.

In the context of Canada, an example of a constitutional amendment that, while important,
did not seem to warrant a highly participatory process of constitutional change was the
amendment to change the name of the "Province of Newfoundland" to the "Province of
Newfoundland and Labrador." ConstitutionAmendment, 2001 (Newfoundlandand
Labrador), S.C. 2001, c. 1.

6.

As will be argued in Part 1, below, democratic legitimacy is a matter of degree, and some
of these mechanisms, as well as their availability in actual constitutional practice and the
political context in which they exist, would result in different degrees of democratic
legitimacy.

7.

1 have also considered the constituent assembly convened from below in Joel Col6n-Rios,
"The End of the Constitutional ism-Democracy Debate" (2010) 28 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc.
Issues 25.
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assembly is generally triggered through the collection of signatures, requiring
popular engagement from its early stages. As means for the (potential) exercise of constituent power, these mechanisms can be used for an entire constitutional overhaul and should not be subject to any substantive limits found in
the constitutional text.'
The article is organized in the following way. First, I introduce the concepts of constituent power, democracy, and democratic legitimacy. Part I thus
begins by outlining the basic tenets of the theory of constituent power and examines the relationship between this concept and the democratic ideal. Moreover, it
explains how the basic condition of democratic legitimacy (susceptibility to reconstitution) emerges from the democratic reading of the theory of constituent
power. In Part II, I examine the distinction between ordinary and fundamental
constitutional change through a discussion of Carl Schmitt and John Rawls's
thoughts on the limits of constitutional reform. As will be shown in Part III,
this distinction is central to my argument: only the latter kind of change amounts
to an act of constitution-(re)making, and would therefore involve and require
an exercise of constituent power. Finally, in Part IV, I consider the constituent
assembly convened by the legislature and the constituent assembly convened
"from below" as devices that, as means for the exercise of constituent power,
would make constitutional regimes susceptible to democratic re-constitution
and consistent with the idea of democratic legitimacy.

1. CONSTITUENT POWER AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
One could examine, attack, or defend the democratic legitimacy of a government, of a decision of a legislature, or of a particular government official. In
this article, however, the question of democratic legitimacy is directed at constitutional regimes. The constitutional regime encompasses the constitution, written
8.

Any institutional device for constitutional change, including a constituent assembly that
operates according to its own rules, creates procedural limits on the exercise of constituent
power. In this respect, it necessarily takes something away from constituent power, either
from its creative force or its capacity to express itself in novel ways. Nevertheless, at least
from the perspective of democracy at the level of a society's fundamental laws, it is better
to have devices that allow for this "imperfect" manifestation of constituent power than to
have nothing.
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or unwritten," and the juridical structures it creates (e.g., the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of governments, as well as the official interpretations and beliefs about what the constitution requires). In other words, a
constitutional regime is -the legal apparatus that shapes the exercise of power
in a given jurisdiction, and its most fundamental component is the document
or the set of prihciples known as "the constitution." In that respect, to talk
about the emergence of a constitutional regime and the emergence of a new
constitution is more or less the same. The conception of a "constitutional regime" and "of the constitution" used here is strictly domestic: obligations created by international treaties (e.g., the World Trade Organization), that for all
practical purposes constitute a sort of supra-constitution, are therefore excluded.10 As stated in the introduction, the conception of democratic legitimacy
that I will present here rests in an important way on the concept of constituent
power. I will therefore begin by introducing the concept of constituent power
and by stressing its connections to democracy and democratic legitimacy.
A. OUTLINING THE THEORY OF CONSTITUENT POWER
Constituent power, a concept that until recently was absent from AngloAmerican constitutional theory," means constitution-making power, the source

9.

An important clarification is in order here. Introducing fundamental changes in an
unwritten constitution is, at least theoretically, easier than doing the same in the context of a
written constitutional text. I say "at least theoretically" because, while unwritten
constitutions can generally be amended by simple legislative majorities, constitutional
traditions are sometimes so embedded in a country's juridical culture that their modification
is in practice very hard to achieve. Constitutions that are unwritten or mostly statutory (like
the Constitution of New Zealand), and are thus susceptible of being amended by simple
legislative majorities, are generally thought to be less vulnerable to the traditional democratic
objection. Nevertheless, they would not necessarily meet the "test" of democratic legitimacy
proposed in this article. That is, democratic legitimacy mandates that a constitution can be
altered through highly participatory procedures akin to those used during democratic
constitution-making episodes, not through the acts of an ordinary legislature.

10.

This is certainly an important discussion, but it is outside the scope of this article. See e.g.
Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the CanadianState
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing
Economic Globalization:Investment Rules and Democracy's Promise(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008).

11.

Lately, constituent power has begun to appear in the work of Anglo-American constitutional
scholars. See e.g. Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds., The Paradoxof Constitutionalism:
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of production of juridical norms. The classical theory of constituent power rests
on a distinction between a will that predates the constitution and is superior to
it (the constituent power) and the positive constitutional forms created by the
constituent subject (the constituted powers), which determine how public power
is to be exercised and how ordinary laws are to be created. More controversially,
the most famous formulations of the theory, those of Emmanuel Sieyks and Carl
Schmitt, 12 attribute to constituent power not only the extraordinary faculty of
constitution making, but also the capacity of not being absorbed by the adoption of a constitution (and, therefore, the capacity of taking precedence over the
established constitutional forms).
The first major elaboration of the distinction between constituted and constituent power was developed by Sieyds in his influential political pamphlet, What
is the Third Estate?, published in 1789." There, Sieyks identified the nation as
the rightful possessor of the constituent power and, as such, as having the faculty to adopt a constitution for France." "The nation," he wrote, "is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed it is the law

ConstituentPower and ConstitutionalReform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
However, it is still common to find major works in which references to constituent power are
scarce or notoriously absent. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People, vol. 1 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1991) [Ackerman, We The People]; Akhil Reed Amar, "The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V' (1994) 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 457; Sanford Levinson, Our UndemocraticConstitution: Where the Constitution Goes
Wrong (And How We the People Can CorrectIt) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)
[Levinson, UndemocraticConstitution];and Walter Murphy, ConstitutionalDemocracy:
Creatingand Maintainingajust PoliticalOrder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2007) [Murphy, ConstitutionalDemocracy].
12.

Emmanuel Joseph Siey-s, What is the Third Estate? (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963); Carl
Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, trans. by Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press,
2008) [Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory].

13.

Sieys, ibid

14.

Siey&s's conception of the "nation" appears to have been free from "ethnicist" qualities.
Sieyds defined the nation as "a body of associates living under common laws and represented
by the same legislative assembly, etc." Ibid. at 58. See also William E. Scheuerman,
"Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt's Challenge to Carl Schmitt" in David
Dyzenhaus, ed., Law as Politics: CarlSchmitt's Critique ofLiberalism (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1998) 252 at 259.
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itself. Prior to and above the nation, there is only naturallaw."" By suggesting
that the nation, as the subject of constituent power, was in a position similar to
the individuals living in the state of nature, Siey~s was able to argue that the exercise of its will was superior to and independent of any constitutional form
or specified procedure. Constituent power, in that sense, signified a legal beginning, an ability to stand outside the established juridical order, assess its desirability, and replace or transform it in important ways:
[t]he national will ... never needs anything but its own existence to be legal. It is
the source of all legality. Not only is the nation not subject to a constitution, but it
16
cannot be and it must not be; which is tantamount to saying that it is not.

Unlike other social contract theorists (such as George Lawson and John
Locke), Sieyds did not restrict the exercise of constituent power to instances of
tyranny or despotism in which government dissolves itself and power reverts
back to the community. He thought that the people cannot be permanently
15.

Sieyds, ibid. at 124 [emphasis in original]. It must be noted that for Siey&s, constituent
power is not an arbitrary power, but is always limited by the imperatives of natural law.
According to Scheuerman,
Sieyds, the social contract theorist, speaks openly of the "sacred" right of property, and he
argues in great detail that the "will of the nation" is legitimate only when it acts in accord
with the "common security, the common liberty and, finally, the common welfare." Thus,
representative bodies are forbidden to undertake nongeneral legal acts, and they have no
authority "to regulate the private affairs of individual citizens." Only if an assembly
representative of the pouvoir constituant respects such standards can it "justify in the name
of reason and fair-play its claim to deliberate and vote for the whole nation without any
exception whatsoever" (ibid at 260 [footnotes omitted]).

16.

Moreover, Sieyds understood the exercise of constituent power as subject to three general
limits: it must result in the production of a new constitution, it must follow the people's
mandate, and it cannot be permanent (its exercise ends with the adoption of a new
constitution, even if it can be re-activated whenever a new constitution is needed). Sicycs,
ibid. at 131.
Sieys, ibid at 126 [emphasis in original]. The association of constituent power with the state of
nature might have the effect of making its exercise equivalent to the transition from the state of
nature to civil society, an idea rejected by Siey&s himself. (As we will see later, Schmitt took
additional efforts to dispel this source of confusion.) There is no doubt that the idea of
constituent power can be used in the context of the founding of a new state and can
therefore be linked with the works of Locke, Rousseau, and Hobbes. However, in
contemporary societies the idea of constituent power already presupposes that the state of
nature has been superseded and instead points to the creation and recreation of a
constitutional regime. Cf Murray Forsyth, "Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the
People" (1981) 29 Political Stud. 191.
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subject to any constitution, that the living cannot waive their right to will, even
after a juridical order is in place, and "cannot lose the right to alter [their decisions] as soon as [their] interest requires.""
The legal and political institutions created through the exercise of constituent
power are identified by Sieyds as the constituted powers. These bodies (e.g., the
executive, legislative, and judicial powers) are always limited by the constitutional
forms that grant their existence and cannot legitimately engage in acts of constitution making." For example, an ordinary legislature must adopt statutes in the
manner prescribed in the constitution and, if granted the power to amend the
constitution, can only do so according to the specific procedures and limits
contained in the constitution. In this respect (and this idea will become crucial
later in the article), for Sieys the ordinary power of constitutional reform is a
constituted, not a constituent, power. However, this only helps to identify a
series of further questions, which, as I argue later, have important implications
for the idea of democratic legitimacy. Is it possible for the constituted power of
constitutional reform to be exercised ultra vires? That is, even if the procedure
mandated by the established amendment process is strictly followed, can the
substantive content of an amendment invade the terrain of the constituent
power and amount to an act of constitution making?
Some of these questions were considered by Schmitt and will be examined
in Part II, below. For now, we should briefly review the ways in which this author developed Sieys's theory. In his comprehensive study of the Weimar Constitution,"9 Schmitt attempted to disengage Siey~s's concept of the constituent
power from its traces of political theology-that is, the constituent power as the
20
naturanaturans, the un-generated source of all forms. For Schmitt, constituent
power is exemplified in the will of a subject capable of deciding its own mode
of political existence.21 He thus rejected the Kelsenian22 doctrine, according to

17.

Sieyds, ibid. at 127.

18.

"A body subjected to constitutional forms cannot take any decision outside the scope of its
constitution." Ibid. at 134. "The power exercised by the government has substance only in so
far it is constitutional; it is legal only in so far as it is based on the prescribed laws" (at 126).

19.
20.

Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 12.
Ibid. at 126. See also Renato Cristi, "Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power"
in Dyzenhaus, supra note 14, 179 at 189.

21.

Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, ibid.
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which the validity of a constitution rests on an abstract norm, and instead
contended that it could only rest on a sovereign decision: "[t]he constitution is
valid by virtue of the existing political will of that which establishes it." 23
Schmitt identified constituent power with sovereignty, which he understood as
the ability to go beyond the legally constituted order, and so its exercise could
not be limited or regulated by law. This does not mean, however, that constituent power is to be identified with the arbitrary will of a supreme commander that had been granted the authority to violate the law whenever it
wished. 2 ' The constituent subject (as in Sieyds) cannot be subject to any positive norm because it is the origin of all positive norms; it is a creative force that
only ignores the established constitutional regime in order to create a new
one-not to perpetuate itself as a supreme lawgiver.
Schmitt also defended and developed Siey~s's idea that constitutions are
born and may die, but that the constituent power on which they rest cannot be
destroyed or consumed by the object of its creation: "[tihe [constituent
power] 2s is not thereby expended and eliminated, because it was exercised once.

22.

Hans Kelsen, "The Function of a Constitution" trans. by lain Stewart in Richard Tur &
William Twining, eds., Essays on Kelsen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 109; Hans Kelsen,
General Theory ofLaw and State, trans. by Anders Wedberg (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1949).

23.

Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, supra note 12 at 76.

24.

This is the conclusion that some authors reach from Schmitt's famous formulation in Political
Theology- "[the sovereign] is he who decides on the exception." Carl Schmitt, Political
Theolog: Four Chapterson the Concept ofSovereignty, trans. by George Schwab (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1985) at 5. See e.g. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Powerand Bare Life
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). However, as Andreas Kalyvas has argued, this
view does not take into consideration Schmitt's distinction between "commissarial" and
"sovereign" dictatorship. While the commissarial dictator is granted unlimited power with
the purpose of achieving the specific task of eliminating a threat to the existing constitutional
regime (e.g., during a state of exception), the sovereign dictator (which can take the form of
an individual or an assembly) is the one who establishes a new legal order and drafts a new
constitution. Unlike the former, the latter form of "dictatorship" should not be identified
with an authoritarian executive invested with the necessary power to restore order, but with
sovereignty, understood as the faculty of establishing new constitutional regimes. Andreas
Kalyvas, "Carl Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy" (2000) 21 Cardozo L. Rev.
1525 at 1533-34.

25.

In the English translation of ConstitutionalTheory, "constituent power" (vefassungsgebenden
Gewalt) was translated as "constitution-making power." For the sake of consistency, I will
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The political decision, which essentially means the constitution, cannot have a
reciprocal effect on its subject and eliminate its political existence. This political will remains alongside and above the constitution." 26 The idea is that constituent power does not disappear after the adoption of a constitution; far from
being a "one-time" event, which is the practical reality of most liberal constitutional regimes, its exercise remains an ever-present possibility. As Scheuerman
has noted, for Schmitt, constituent power "continues to have a very real existence above and beyond the institutional complex of liberal constitutionalism." 27 This is why, at least in part, constituent power should not be identified
with the founding of a new state. For Schmitt, constituent power presupposes
the existence of the state: the existence of a people already organized politically.
In the language of modern political theory, it is premised on the idea that the
"social contract" is already in place and so the transition from the state of nature to civil society has already occurred.28 It is a power that, while permanently
threatening the existing constitutional regime, has the potential to become a
legally unlimited democratic force.
B. CONSTITUENT POWER, POPULAR PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRATIC
OPENNESS
"To speak of constituent power," writes Antonio Negri, "is to speak of democracy. In the modern age the two concepts have often been related."" Constituent power, like democracy, points toward a self-determining demos, a populace
that adopts the constitution that will regulate its political association. In that
sense, to say that the people are the bearers of the constituent power is to say
that they ought to be sovereign and that in the exercise of that sovereignty they
should be allowed to have any constitution they want, whenever they want it. It

26.
27.
28.

29.

replace the phrase "constitution-making power" with "constituent power" when quoting
directly from the English translation. Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 12.
Ibid. at 125. Schmitt's conception of the "Constitution" will be discussed in Part II, below.
Scheuerman, supra note 14 at 257.
"The social contract, consequently, is already presupposed in the theory of constitutionmaking power of people when one considers its construction necessary at all." Schmitt,
ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 12 at 112.
Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: ConstituentPower and the Modern State (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999) at 1.
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is .thus not surprising that constituent power and democracy have historically
been accused of the same flaws: instability, revolutions, and lack of respect for
the rule of law. A multitude always getting what it wants, continually making
and unmaking the fundamental agreements of a society, represents the antithesis of good government-the rule of people's ever-changing wishes against the
empire of law and reason."0 This is the kind of disaster constitutions seek to
avoid: the popular will that needs to be protected from itself and domesticated
through the adoption of various juridical forms.
But constituent power is not merely the faculty of making a constitution
without being subject to any form of positive law; it is the power of making a
constitution together. By the exercise of constituent power, the constitution
makers create the constitutional forms that will regulate their political association. In other words, constituent power mandates that those living under a set
of fundamental laws participate in the creation and recreation of those laws.
The very meaning of the concept of constituent power requires that the constitutional forms be jointly created. As Andreas Kalyvas has explained, the term constituere, which is formed by the prefix con ("with," "together") and the suffix
statuere ("to set up," "to construct," "to place"), literally means "the act of
founding together,founding in concert, creatingjointly, or co-establishing... . The
correct use of the term 'to constitute' prescribes that if one wants to constitute a
new constitution, for example, one ought to coinstitute it, to institute it jointly
with others."'
Even Carl Friedrich, who identified constituent power with the "right to
revolution," defined it as the power of a group to establish a constitution.32
Similarly, Ulrich Preuss writes, "Conceptually [constituent power] cannot be
attributed to any single person, even a monarch."" The constituent power, he
30. See e.g. Jean Bodin, Six Books ofthe Commonwealth (Oxford: Blackwell, n.d.) at 192-93. See
also Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. by Duncan Forbes
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978) at 187.
31.

Andreas Kalyvas, "The Basic Norm and Democracy in Hans Kelsen's Legal and Political
Theory" (2006) 32 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 573 at 588-89 [emphasis in original].

32. Carl J. Friedrich, ConstitutionalGovernment andDemocracy: Theory andPractice in Europe
andAmerica (Boston: Ginn, 1950) at 132.
33. Ulrich Preuss, "Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the
Relations between Constituent Power and the Constitution" (1993) 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 639
at 647. Two famous twentieth-century dictators claimed to be the bearers of constituent
power: Pinochet, in Chile, and Franco, in Spain. See Renato Cristi, "The Metaphysics of
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adds, "is the power of a collective body, which by the very act of constitutiongiving, exercises its right to self-rule."" Although constituent power is by definition a democratic power, its absolute and unconstrained nature means that it
can put at risk the democratic content of a constitutional regime. However, as
suggested above, despite its unlimited nature (unlimited only with regard to
established law), constituent power comes (inherently) accompanied by an important procedural limitation: its exercise must include in the process of making a constitution those that will become subject to it. The connection of this
aspect of constituent power to democracy is obvious: democracy, as constituent
power, requires the participation of citizens in the positing of all laws, fundamental laws included.
Democracy involves an affirmation of the "equal sharing of activity and
power"" of all citizens. It requires the participation of the citizens in the production of the law, even if for practical reasons (e.g., the size of a complex modern society) they cannot always participate directly and fully. 6 For example, at
the level of day-to-day politics, it would be impossible, and perhaps undesirable,
for citizens to propose, deliberate, and decide on the content of each and every
ordinary law. But when the real opportunity of citizens' direct involvement in
the making of political decisions is present, such as in an episode of constitutional change, democracy demands that the means are available for heightened.
popular participation-oneof the basic features of the democratic ideal-to
become a reality. In fact, it would be very strange to find anyone that, while
committed to the democratic ideal, would say that, as a matter of principle, it is

Constituent Power: Schmitt and the Genesis of Chile's 1980 Constitution" (2000).21
Cardozo L. Rev. 1749. Schmitt accepted the possibility that a monarch (or any entity with
the power of adopting a constitution) could be the subject of constituent power, and even
identified as "constitutional annihilation" what occurred when there was a change in the
identity of the constituent subject (e.g., a constituent monarch replaced by a constituent
people or vice versa). He nevertheless maintained that in a democracy-a political form to
which he was not committed-the only legitimate subject of constituent power could be the
people. Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 12 at 138, 142, 147.
34.

Preuss, ibid. at 647.

35.

Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy" in The Castoriadis
Reader, ed. and trans. by David Ames Curtis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 267 at 275.

36.

On this point, see Ackerman, We The People, supranote 11. For a critique of Ackerman's
theory of constitutional politics that argues that his conception does not require the actual
participation of citizens in constitutional change, see Col6n-Rios, supra note 7.
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better if citizens are left out of the process of recreating a constitution-that
they should not be allowed to become the authors of the constitutional regime
to which they are subject. However, that is precisely how many constitutions
approach constitutional reform. In Canada, for example, the existing amendment rules leave constitutional reform in the exclusive hands of the federal and
provincial legislatures." This deficit of popular participation in constitutional
change, as I will argue in the next subsection, has profound implications for the
democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime.
Constituent power, by virtue of being unlimited by any form of positive
law, is also directly related to another basic feature of democracy, which can be
identified as the ideal of democratic openness: the idea that a democratic society
is an open society-that is, one in which even the most fundamental principles
are open for discussion and are always susceptible of being reformulated or replaced through democratic procedures. Democratic self-government not only
requires the participation of the citizenry in the production of the laws, but entails a "community of citizens-the demos-[that] proclaims that it is absolutely sovereign."" As Claude Lefort has put it, democracy allows "no law that
can be fixed, whose articles cannot be contested, whose foundations are not
susceptible of being called into question."" Constituent power is a conceptual
expression of the ideal of democratic openness, the faculty of human beings to
make the laws that regulate their political association, and the capacity to alter
their fundamental commitments democratically. As noted above, one of the
most important-and controversial-aspects of the classical theory of constituent power is precisely this: that the pouvoir constituant cannot be extinguished
and can be exercised any moment after the original act of constitution making.
The amendment procedures of most modern constitutions, like the American.or Canadian ones, which purposively make change difficult and unlikely-

37.

See Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. It has been argued, however, that since the faled Charlottetown Accord, a constitutional
convention has been emerging according to which constitutional amendments must be
subject to a referendum. See Russell, ConstitutionalOdyssey, supra note I at 239. As will be
argued later, a referendum, by itself, is not a sufficient mechanism from the point of view of
popular participation.

38.

Castoriadis, supra note 35.

39.

Claude Lefort, "The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism" in PoliticalForms ofModern
Society: Bureaucracy,Democracy, Totalitarianism(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986) at 303-04.
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in the case of the Canadian Constitution, this difficulty is present at least with
regard to certain types of amendments-is of course in direct conflict with all
this."o Typical amendment procedures usually involve a set of requirements
that are characterized not only by being difficult to meet, but that are sometimes
more difficult to meet than those followed when the constitution was originally adopted. (Again, the Canadian experience is telling in this respect, requiring provincial unanimity for some changes, while having been adopted with the
objection of the province of Quebec.)" Amendments are thus traditionally
associated with supermajorities and other obstacles designed to decrease the
possibility of important transformations. Moreover, as we will see later, some
constitutions put certain clauses outside the scope of the amending power.
Now, this does not mean that a flexible constitution-for instance, an unwritten constitution that can be altered by simple legislative majorities-is necessarily
consistent with the ideal of democratic openness. Democratic openness requires
an openness that can be accessed by the citizenry, one that is accompanied by
real opportunities for the participation of ordinary citizens.
C. CONSTITUENT POWER AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
The conception of democratic legitimacy advanced in this article looks at the
ways in which a constitutional regime can be changed-at its susceptibility to
democratic alteration.'" Put differently, it asks whether a constitution is consistent
40.

See e.g. U.S. Const. art. V. In the case of Canada, see Part II(A), below.

41.

Despite the frequently repeated statement that constitutions bind majorities because they are
adopted by supermajorities, the route usually followed by most constituent assemblies
throughout the world is to adopt constitutions through majority rule (sometimes subjecting
them to a popular referendum before they come into effect), but at the same time to require
legislative supermajorities (and, again, sometimes popular referendums) for constitutional
amendments. For example, the most recently adopted constitution at the time of writing this
article, the Constitution of Ecuador, was adopted through a constituent assembly which had
the power to approve the constitutional text (that would then be submitted to the electorate
in a referendum) through the affirmative vote of a simple majority of its members, while the
amendment rule they created involved legislative supermajorities plus popular ratification.

42.

This type of clause will be discussed further in Part III, below. See also Richard Albert,
"Nonconstitutional Amendments" (2009) 22 Can. J.L. & Jur. 5 [Albert, "Nonconstitutional
Amendments").

43.

The question of democratic legitimacy is addressed in a direct manner by Schmitt, who
maintained that "the logically consistent democratic theory knows no legitimate constitution
other than a constitution based on the people's [constituent power]." Schmitt, Constitutional
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with the ideals of popular participation and democratic openness, whether it
provides an opening for constituent power to manifest from time to time.
Under this view, democratic legitimacy is not about the procedure that the
constitution establishes for law making, but about the procedures it establishes
for its own transformation; it is a conception heavily informed by constituent
power and its democratic implications. Not everyone thinks about the legitimacy of constitutional regimes in this way. It is frequently argued, for example,
that the legitimacy of a constitution depends on whether "those who are governed by it, including the organs of the state, acquiesce to its terms."" Under
that view, "legitimacy will almost invariably be relative, since there will always
be those citizens who have views diverging from the precepts even of a wellestablished and popular constitution."4
This kind of approach, reminiscent of Max Weber's sociological conception of legitimacy," is not only at odds with the idea of democratic legitimacy,
but-at least potentially-with the very idea of democracy. For example, it
would consider legitimate a constitution imposed by an external agent according to which a sole individual exercises unlimited power, as long as the relevant
group of human beings "acquiesce[s] to its terms." There are other approaches
to legitimacy that reject this sociological conception, arguing instead that the

Theory, supra note 12 at 143. It should be clear that I decisively depart from the Schmittian
conception of democratic legitimacy in one fundamental sense. Schmitt's conception, while
resting on the theory of constituent power, is highly problematic: it accepts the mere "consent"
of the electorate, as expressed in the participation in regular elections, for example, as evidence
that the constitution is based on the people's constituent power:
[a] conclusive action is discernible in the mere participation in public life a constitution provides, for example, an action through which the people's constitution-making will expresses
itself clearly enough. That is valid for the participation in elections, which brings with it a
certain political condition (at 138-39)
In contrast to this conception, my approach to constituent power supposes an episode of
heightened popular participation, different from the acts of participation that take place in
the course of ordinary politics.
44. Frangois Venter, "Constitution Making and the Legitimacy of the Constitution" in Antero
Jyritnki, ed., NationalConstitutions in the Era ofIntegration (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1999) 9 at 21.
45. Ibid.
46.

For a discussion of Weber's and other conceptions of legitimacy, see David Beetham, The
Legitimation ofPower (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1991).

47.

Venter, supra note 44.
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legitimacy of a constitution depends on whether its content can be justified according to normative principles that any rational and unbiased person would
agree to. This conception of legitimacy, which can be identified as the "philosophical approach," is exemplified in the work of John Rawls." According to
Rawls's conception of political legitimacy,
[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy.4

Despite their sophistication and appeal, these approaches are insufficient
from the perspective of democratic legitimacy insofar as they can be made entirely consistent with constitutions adopted from the top down, not susceptible
to democratic re-constitution. I make reference to them in order to stress that
democratic legitimacy is a broader idea than "legitimacy" as such. Its "democratic" element connects the idea of legitimacy to democracy and its corollaries
of openness and popular participation. In that respect, it is also more specific
than other conceptions of democratic legitimacy. For instance, Joshua Cohen
maintains that "[t]he fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that the authorization to exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of
the members of a society who are governed by that power."o But this definition is
too general; it leaves to one's imagination how collective decisions are to be made,
how citizens are supposed to authorize the exercise of state power, and whether,
and how, they can later decide to change the ways in which state power is to be
exercised. It is better to say that the basic condition for democratic legitimacy is
the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws-that ordinary citizens have the real possibility of participating in the re-constitution of

48. John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) at 224. See
also Randy E. Barnett, "Constitutional Legitimacy" (2003) 103 Colum. L. Rev. 111. Barnett
argues that the legitimacy of a constitution depends on whether it establishes procedures that
guarantee that laws will be "just."
49.

Rawls, ibid. at 137. For a discussion that challenges the separateness of different conceptions
of legitimacy, see Richard Fallon, Jr., "Legitimacy and the Constitution" (2005) 118 Harv.
L. Rev. 1787.

50.

Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy" in Seyla Benhabib,
ed., Democracy andDifference: Contestingthe Boundariesofthe Political(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996) 95 at 95.
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the norms that govern the state through highly participatory procedures. In
other words, the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime depends on
the way in which it approaches the question of constituent power.5 '
There are, however, degrees of democratic legitimacy, and the susceptibility
to democratic re-constitution should be understood as the minimal condition of
democratic legitimacy. That is to say, there are institutional forms that could
increase the democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime well above this
minimum. For example, a "fully" democratically legitimate constitutional regime
would also have originated in a democratic constitution-making episode, one
characterized by intense episodes of popular participation and by the absence of
any external or internal limits--other than those self-imposed by the constitution
maker, such as those limits found in a country's political culture-on the content
of the new constitution. Most constitutional regimes (especially, but not only,
those with very old constitutions) would not even come close to meeting the requirement of a democratic pedigree, a defect that can only be superseded by the
adoption of a new constitution or by the ratification of the existing one through
a special participatory procedure.52 Most modern constitutions were adopted by

51.

Andreas Kalyvas has connected constituent power to the idea of democratic legitimacy, but
his conception seems to focus on the democratic origins of the constitution and not on the
possibility of it being altered through highly democratic means: "[i]n a democratic regime,
the legitimacy of the fundamental norms and institutions depends on how inclusive the participation of citizens is during the extraordinary and exceptional moment of constitution
making." Andreas Kalyvas, "Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power"
(2005) 12 Constellations 223 at 237. This kind of passage suggests that constituent power is
only relevant at the time of making a new constitution. Perhaps what Kalyvas means is that
every important constitutional transformation counts as an act of "constitution making" in
itself, thus implicitly recognizing the possibility of constitutional (re)making.

52.

This conception of democratic legitimacy is put under great stress in constitutional regimes
in which there are competing claims to constituent power. For instance, in a constitutional
regime that faces a demand of secession by a segment of the citizenry, the question of
democratic legitimacy seems more like a luxury than a real political aspiration: when the
objective is keeping the constitutional regime from falling into pieces, the idea of democracy
at the level of the fundamental laws is not a priority. In this kind of situation, the central
question becomes: what group(s) has the constituent power? The answer to this question is
decisive with respect to democratic legitimacy because whoever has the constituent power has
the power to legitimate the constitutional regime or to establish a separate, potentially
legitimate one. This is an answer that is profoundly political: it is to be found in political
struggle and argumentation and not in established domestic or international law. Suffice it to
say that while the competing claim to constituent power might have its roots in nationalism,
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political elites, with the exclusion of large sectors of the population." But a constitutional regime which lacks a democratic pedigree can rest its claims to democratic legitimacy in its susceptibility to re-constitution through mechanisms
that facilitate the exercise of constituent power, that attempt to replicate a democratic constitution-making episode. (That said, it is unlikely that a constitution produced by an authoritarian government or by an external lawgiver would
ever be able to enjoy something more than the weakest degree of democratic
legitimacy possible, even in the unlikely situation that it contains mechanisms
that allow for democratic re-constitution. In those extreme cases, a new constitution-making episode may in fact be a democratic necessity.)5"
Now, for the possibility of democratic re-constitution to mean something,
it must have actual institutional implications." In other words, the constitutional
forms must provide the means for constituent power to reappear after the constitution is in place, and, if needed, to put the entire institutional arrangement
into question. To begin with, basic political rights must be in place: freedom of
association, freedom of speech, the right to vote-in short, those rights of political participation necessary for the very existence of democracy and for any

it might partly rest in what is perceived as a democratically illegitimate constitutional regime:
a constitution that is seen as imposed on part of the citizenry, even if it is a constitution that
contains what are thought to be the right abstract principles. In Canada, the case of Quebec
might be seen as providing an example of this last point. See Russell, ConstitutionalOdyssey,
supra note 1.
53. Again, the history of the making of the US Constitution is telling in this respect.
54.

Moreover, a recently created constitution that was not adopted democratically but is susceptible
to democratic alteration would have a much weaker claim to democratic legitimacy than a
regime whose constitution was adopted by previous generations but can be altered
democratically.

55.

The basic condition of democratic legitimacy is also connected to the principle of the "rule
by the people" in one fundamental sense. To say that the people rule themselves is to say that
they are a "self-governing" people: a group of human beings that come together as political
equals and give themselves the laws that will regulate their conduct and the institutions under
which they live. A self-governing people must be able to reformulate their commitments
democratically: for there to be democratic self-rule, no rule can be taken for granted or be
impossible (or virtually impossible) to change. See Alan Keenan, Democracy in Question:
Democratic Openness in a Time ofPoliticalClosure (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003) at 10.
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exercise of constituent power." Of course, there could be a political revolution
in which, through an act of popular participation, those guarantees are abolished. But-even when the constituent subject is free to adopt any constitution it
wants, the abolition of the rights of political participation would be inconsistent
with the future exercise of constituent power, eliminating the possibility of democratic re-constitution, and therefore inconsistent with any prospects of democratic legitimacy. Like democracy, constituent power negates itself when it
violates the conditions that make it possible; although, even after a situation
like this, constituent power might reappear through some sort of popular revolution." In this last respect, democratic legitimacy would be inconsistent with,
for instance, a dictatorship established through a democratically elected constituent assembly and ratified by the people in a referendum. Such a regime
would not be susceptible to democratic re-constitution-that is, it would not
meet the basic condition of democratic legitimacy-as it would not contain the
guarantees and institutions that allow citizens to deliberate and decide on the
future of their constitutional regime.
Beyond the recognition of basic rights of political participation, a constitutional regime must have some mechanisms in place (in addition to the ordinary
amendment procedure) designed to allow citizens to propose, deliberate, and
decide on fundamental changes to the constitution. These institutions, the specifics of which will be discussed in Part IV, below, should allow for the greatest

56. For a good, concise discussion, see Walter Murphy, "Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and
Democracy" in Douglas Greenberg et at, eds., Constitutionalismand Democracy: Transitions
in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 3 at 3-5.
57.

Perhaps this is what the delegates to the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly had in mind
when, after recognizing the unlimited constituent power of the people, they included a
constitutional provision that states, "The people of Venezuela, loyal to the republican
tradition, to their independence struggle, to peace and freedom, will not recognize
[desconoceri] any regime, law, or authority that is inconsistent with the democratic values,
principles, and guarantees or that erodes human rights." Constitucidnde la Repiblica
Bolivariana de Venezuela (Constitution ofthe Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999), art. 350
[translated by author] [Constitutionof Venezuela, 1999]. The original text in Spanish reads,
"El pueblo de Venezuela, fiel a su tradici6n republicana, a su lucha por la independencia, la
paz y la libertad, desconoceri cualquier rigimen, legislaci6n o autoridad que contrarie los
valores, principios y garantias democriticos o menoscabe los derechos humanos."
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possible degree of popular participation in constitutional change, and, as facilitators of the exercise of constituent power, must not be subject to any substantive limits originating in the established juridical order. It is not clear, however,
when these extraordinary institutions should be activated, or whether they can
co-exist with more traditional methods of constitutional reform. Does democratic legitimacy require an exercise of constituent power every time a constitution is amended? These questions will be the object of Part II.

II. THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:
CONSTITUENT POWER AND ORDINARY AMENDMENTS
Amendment rules are a central component of any constitutional regime: such
rules help to differentiate between ordinary and higher laws, a distinction important for democratic legitimacy and constituent power." These rules involve
different types of limits, the most common being procedural ones. Not just any
act of a legislature or manifestation of a large group of individuals produces a
formal amendment to a constitution. For instance, and as stated in Part I(B),
above, most constitutional texts include an amendment formula that contains
different types of obstacles (such as the requirement of legislative supermajorities)
that must be surpassed before any change is adopted, and some constitutions also
contain explicit substantive limits (sometimes called "eternity," "intangibility,"
or "entrenchment" clauses) to constitutional reform." For instance, Article 139
of the Constitution of Italy establishes that "[t]he republican form of the state
may not be changed by way of constitutional amendment."" Article 112 of the
Norwegian Constitution is much more general, establishing that amendments
must never ... contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but
solely relate to modifications of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit
of the Constitution."" Most constitutions, however, do not contain these types

58.

59.
60.
61.

As Sujit Choudhry has expressed, rules governing constitutional amendments stipulate where
the ultimate locus of political sovereignty lies. They are "the most basic statement of a
community's political identity." Sujit Choudhry, "Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New
Nation-Building: Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities" (2005) 37
Conn. L. Rev. 933 at 939.
For a recent discussion, see Albert, "Nonconstitutional Amendments," supra note 42. See
also Richard Albert, "Counterconstitutionalism" (2008) 31 Dal. L.J. 1.
Costituzione della Repubblica italiana(Constitution ofthe Italian Republic), 1947, art. 139.
Kongeriget Norges Grundlov (Norwegian Constitution), 1814, art. 112.
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of limits and, perhaps partly to fill that void, some constitutionalists have developed the doctrine of implicit limits. The doctrine has been summarized in
the following way: "[a]ny amending body organized within the statutory
scheme, howsoever verbally unlimited its power, cannot by its very structure
change the fundamental pillars supporting its constitutional authority."62
The idea that the power to reform a constitution is subject to implicit substantive limits is not new. Aristotle seems to have suggested it when he asked,
"On what principles ought we to say that a state has retained its identity, or,
conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different state?"" The answer
provided by Aristotle was that a polis's identity changes when its constitution is
altered as a result of an interruption of its essential commitments." A change in
the polis's identity cannot be considered a mere reform, but the birth of a new
regime. This idea is also reflected in Article 16 of the French Declarationof the
Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, which reads, "Any society in which the
guarantee of rights is not secured, or the separation of powers not determined,
has no constitution at all."" If the existence of a constitution depends on the
protection of certain rights and on the separation of powers, an attempt to suppress these principles (even an attempt that respects the formal amendment
formula) cannot be understood as a mere amendment: it would amount to the
destruction of the constitution as opposed to the modification of an already existing one."6 In fact, French constitutional theory has developed the doctrine of
"constitutional fraud" (fraude h la Constitution) to identify the act of using the
formal amendment rule in order to create a different constitutional regime.

Dietrich Conrad, as cited in A.G. Noorani, "Behind the 'Basic Structure' Doctrine: On
India's Debt to a German Jurist, Professor Dietrich Conrad" Frontline 18:9 (28 April 2001),
online: <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/f1l809/18090950.htm>.
63. Aristotle, The Politics ofAristotle, trans. by Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1962) at 98, as cited in Gary Jeffrey Jacobson, "An Unconstitutional Constitution? A
Comparative Perspective" (2006) 4 Int'l J. Con. L. 460 at 478.
62.

64.

Ibid.

France, Diclarationdes droits de I'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 (Declarationof the Rights of
Man and ofthe Citizen, 1789), art. 16.
66. For a discussion, see Pedro de Vega, La Reforma Constitucionalyla Problemdticadel Poder
Constituyente (Madrid: T6cnos, 1985) at 268.
65.

67.

Ibid. at 291.
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Courts in countries such as Germany," Colombia," India," and Peru" have
adopted, on different grounds, the doctrine of implicit limits to constitutional
reform. This doctrine is of fundamental importance for the conception of democratic legitimacy presented here: it allows us to differentiate between mere
amendments and (re)constitution-making episodes.
A. SCHMITT AND RAWLS ON CONSTITUENT POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The doctrine of implicit limits points toward a distinction between ordinary
constitutional change and the exercise of constituent power. The thinking of
Schmitt and Rawls on constitutional reform also points in this direction. It is
not commonplace to find similarities in the thoughts of authors with such different intellectual and political orientations as Rawls and Schmitt. The former
was a leading liberal political philosopher and the latter was directly involved with
Nazism after 1933; it is hard to find two scholars with more radically opposing
trajectories. Rawls and Schmitt, however, share a fundamental conception about
the limits of constitutional reform. They both believed that a constitutional
amendment, even if adopted with the strictest respect for the procedures established in the constitutional text, could be unconstitutional if it resulted in the
creation of a different constitutional regime.7
Schmitt, whose conception of constituent power was discussed in Part I,
developed a theory of constitutional amendments that draws a clear distinction

68.

See Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951) in Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, eds.,
ComparativeConstitutionalLaw: Cases and Commentaries (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1977) 208. See also Klass Case, 30 BVerfGE 1 (1970) and Electronic EavesdroppingCase, 109
BVerfGE 279 (2004). More recently, see Lisbon Case, BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/08 (the judgment
of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009, where the concept of
constituent power was discussed at length).

69.

See Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentencia C-551/03 (2003); Sentencia C-1040/05
(2005).

70.

See KesavanandaBharatiSrspadagalvaruv. State ofKerala,A.I.R. 1973 SC 1461 and Minerva
Mills Ltd. v. Union ofIndia, A.I.R. 1980 SC 1789 at 1798.

71.

See Tribunal Constitucional del Peru (Constitutional Tribunal of Peru), Sentencia No. 0502004-AI/TC; Sentencia No. 007-2005-PI/TC; and Sentencia No. 009-2005-PI/TC.

72.

Note that the emphasis here is not on the mechanisms that could be used in order to enforce
the implicit limits (e.g., judicial review of constitutional amendments), but on the realization
that there are some parts of a constitution that are of a higher order than others.
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between the power of constitutional reform and constituent power. Schmitt
defended a distinction between the "Constitution" (understood as the conscious
decision of the constituent subject on the determinate mode of its political existence) and mere "constitutional laws" (understood as individual constitutional
clauses enumerated in the document called "the constitution" but lacking a
truly fundamental character)." The kind of decisions that make the Constitution different from particular constitutional laws can often be identified in the
constitutional text, usually in those articles that refer to the basic structure of
government. For instance, in the context of the Weimar Constitution
(Schmitt's specific frame of reference), these decisions included Article 1's
adoption of democracy as a form of government, rejection of monarchy,7 4
adoption of a federal structure of government, parliamentarism, and the institutions of the "bourgeois Reschstaat with its principles, fundamental rights, and
separation of powers."" Moreover, Schmitt maintained that an alteration of Article 76 (the amendment procedure) would also amount to the elimination of
the Constitution: the power to reform the constitution cannot be used to modify the legal provision to which it owes its existence.
Constitutional laws, in contrast, are simply norms that have been included
in the written constitution in order to protect them from ordinary parliamentary majorities.n To continue with the Weimar Constitution, one could refer to
Article 149 as an example of a constitutional law: "[u]niversities will maintain
73. Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 12 at 75-80. See also Jeffrey Seitzer, "Carl Schmitt's
Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism: Verfassungslebre as a Response to the Weimar
State Crisis" in Dyzenhaus, supra note 14, 281 at 290.
74. Article 1 of the Weimar Constitutionstates, "The German Reich is a Republic" and "All state
authority stems from the people." Germany, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs ("Weimarer
Reichsverfassung") (The Constitutionofthe German Reich ("Weimar Constitution")), 1919, art.
I [Weimar Constitution]. See Schmitt, ConititutionalTheory, ibid at 77.
75. Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, ibid.at 78 [emphasis in original].
76. Ibid at 150. This point is especially relevant when a democratic amendment formula is seen
as one of the guarantors of democratic legitimacy. The problem of amending the "amendment
formula" through the amendment formula itself has also been approached from the perspective
of the logic and coherence of a constitutional system. See Alf Ross, "On Self-Reference and a
Puzzle in Constitutional Law" (1969) 78 Mind 1. See also Peter Suber, The ParadoxofSelfAmendment: A Study ofLogic, Law, Omnipotence, andChange (New York: Peter Lang, 1990).
77.

Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, ibid at 67.
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Faculties of Theology."" Schmitt believed that constitutional laws were the
proper object of the ordinary power of constitutional reform, as opposed to
the fundamental decisions contained in the Constitution, which can only be
touched by the constituent subject. Thus, an alteration or suppression of the
above-mentioned Article 149 through the ordinary amendment procedure
would be perfectly valid, while the substitution of Article 1 for a clause that
reads, "All power stems from the King," regardless of how respectful one is of
the amendment formula, would signify the annihilation" of the Constitution
and the revolutionary creation of a new one.o It is not that constitutional laws
are unimportant; they were considered important by the constitution makers
and that is why they were included in the document called "the constitution."
However, constitutional laws fall short of having the fundamental character
of the decisions pertaining to a people's political existence. It is thus absurd,
according to Schmitt, to attribute equal status to all constitutional provisions,
to see a Constitution simply as a collection of clauses that are different from
ordinary laws by virtue of not being susceptible to amendment by a simple
legislative majority.
For Schmitt, those constitutions that contain explicit limits to the amending
power, like the Italian and Norwegian Constitutions (mentioned above), simply
make clear the distinction between amendment and revolution, between constitutional reform and an act of constituent power: if something is put outside the
scope of the amending power, it must be because it is of such a fundamental
character that it can only be altered by an exercise of constituent power.8 1 In

78.

Weimar Constitution, supra note 74, art. 149.

79.

Schmitt distinguished between "constitutional elimination," "constitutional annihilation,"
and "constitutional change." Constitutional elimination involves the alteration of the
substantive core of the constitution, constitutional annihilation involves a change in the
identity of the constituent subject, and constitutional change involves a revision ofthe
constitutional laws (leaving the fundamental political decisions intact). Schmitt, Constitutional
Theory, supra note 12 at 147.

80.

Ibid.Of course, the principles protected by Article 1 could also be changed, while leaving the
text of that article untouched and inserting into the constitution several clauses that result in
its abolition for all practical purposes.

81.

Ibid.at 152. As Dietrich Conrad has expressed, "Such provisions [that establish explicit
limits on the power to reform a constitution] are valuable indications that the power to
amend does not by the nature of things participate in the supposed omnipotence of constituent
sovereignty but is a constituted, and hence legally definable, power." "Limitation of
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fact, he argued that, even in the context of those constitutions that explicitly
allow for the "total revision"82 of the constitutional text, or in countries with
unwritten or partially unwritten constitutions, a change in the basic form of
government (e.g., replacing a republic with a monarchy) would go beyond the
realm of constitutional reform and could not be considered constitutional" The
idea is that the power to reform a constitution, a constituted power, does not
include the power to produce the kind of profound changes proper of an exercise of constituent power." Only the constituent subject is capable of altering
the Constitution, understood as equivalent to the fundamental decisions about
its form of political existence. When this happens, it does not make sense to
speak about constitutional reform, but about constitution making, about the
creation of a new and diferent Constitution. The fundamental political decisions "are a matter for the [constituent power] of the German people and are
not part of the jurisdiction of the organs authorized to make constitutional
changes and revisions."" Accordingly,
[t]he boundaries of the authority for constitutional amendments result from the
properly understood concept of constitutional change. The authority to "amend
the constitution," granted by constitutional legislation, means that other constitutional provisions can substitute for individual or multiple ones. They may do so,
however, only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the
constitution as an entirety is preserved. This means the authority for constitutional
amendment contains only the grant of authority to undertake changes, additions,
extensions, deletions, etc., in constitutional provisions that preserve the constitution itself. It is not the authority to establish a new constitution... . The offices
Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power" (1966-1967) 15-16 The Indian Y.B.
Int'l Aff. 375 at 379. Nevertheless, Conrad argued that the ambiguity of these kind of clauses
makes them "little more than guide-posts to systematic interpretation and doctrine." Consider,
for instance, that commentators in France disagree on the correct interpretation of a
constitutional clause that reads, "The republican form of government shall not be the object
of an amendment." France, La Constitution de 1958 (ConstitutionofFrance, 1958), art. 89.
For some, this clause should be understood only as a prohibition of the restoration of
monarchy; for others, it should be interpreted more broadly, as including other principles
such as secularism, the rule of law, etc.
82.

See e.g. Constitutionfidirale de la Confiderationsuisse (FederalConstitution of the Swiss
Confederation), 18 April 1999, art. 192: "[tlhe Federal Constitution may be subjected to a
total or a partial revision at any time."

83.

Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory, supra note 12 at 152.

84.

Ibid.at 151.
bid at 74. 152.

85.
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with jurisdiction over a decision on a constitution-amending statute do not
thereby become the bearer or subject of the constitution-making power.

Rawls reached a similar conclusion in PoliticalLiberalism, where he embraced
the "radical idea"" that not every change introduced into the US Constitution
according to Article V, its amending provision, produces a valid amendment.
For Rawls, the adoption of a "democratic constitution" should be understood
as an expression of the constituent people of governing itself in a certain way
and of fixing, once and for all, certain constitutional essentials." These constitutional essentials refer to: (1) fundamental principles that specify the general
structure of government and the political process, such as the powers of the
legislature, executive, and the judiciary, and the scope of majority rule; and (2)
basic political rights and liberties that legislative majorities are to respect, such
as the right to vote and participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of
thought and of association, and the protections of the rule of law." Constitutional essentials are to be considered higher law (and as such, an expression of
the people's constituent power) and are to be distinguished from the creations
"of Congress and of the electorate."9
Must an amendment touching and altering these constitutional essentials,
asked Rawls, be necessarily accepted as valid by the Supreme Court?91 For Rawls,
the answer is a clear "no." He maintained that to be valid, a constitutional
amendment of this sort must do at least one of the following things: (1) alter
basic institutions in order to remove weaknesses that come to light in subsequent constitutional practice (e.g., the Twenty-second Amendment,92 limiting
the president to two terms); or (2) adjust basic constitutional values to changing
political and social circumstances or incorporate a broader understanding of

86.

Ibid. at 150-51.

87.

Samuel Freeman, "Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution
(1994) 69 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 619 at 662.

88.

Rawls, supra note 48 at 232.

89.

Ibid.

90.

Ibid at 231. On this point Rawls followed Bruce Ackerman's theory of dualist democracy.
However, Ackerman rejected the possibility of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. See Bruce Ackerman, "Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law" (1989) Yale L.J.
453 at 469-70.

91.

Rawls, ibid. at 233, 238.

92.

U.S. Const. amend. XXII.
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those values (e.g., the Nineteenth Amendment," which granted women the
right to vote)." As examples, Rawls considered an amendment to repeal the
First Amendment of the US Constitution in order to establish an official religion, and the suppression of the Fourteenth Amendment with its equal protection
of the laws. Rawls argued that even if these amendments were enacted according to the amendment rule, they should be declared invalid by the judiciary.
When confronted with the question of their validity, courts should say that
they contradict "the constitutional tradition of the oldest democratic regime in
the world."" The idea is that the constitutional text might be amended in order
to make its protections more inclusive or to correct weaknesses in the basic institutions, but not to repeal or reverse its essential protections:' 6
{s]hould that happen, and it is not inconceivable that the exercise of political
power might take that turn, that would be a constitutional breakdown, or revolution in the proper sense, and not a valid amendment of the constitution. The successful practice of its ideas and principles over two centuries place restrictions on
97
what can count as an amendment, whatever was true at the beginning.

Both Schmitt and Rawls defended the view that the power of constitutional
reform is not unlimited, and that there can be such a thing as an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Although Schmitt focused on those principles that tend to express the basic form of the polity, and Rawls stressed the
recognition of fundamental rights (whose non-amendable character appears to
be connected to the fact that they have been respected for a long period of time),
they agreed that there are certain constitutional provisions that cannot be the
object of constitutional reform. It is not clear, and this is where these two authors differ, whether the limits created by Rawls's "constitutional tradition" also
apply to the people in the exercise of constituent power. The "confusion" stems
from Rawls's apparent identification of constituent power and the power to
amend a constitution through the ordinary amendment procedure (e.g., Article
93. U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
94. Rawls, supra note 48 at 238-39. For a similar view, see Walter F. Murphy, "Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity" in Sanford Levinson, ed.,
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory andPracticeof ConstitutionalAmendment (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995) 163 at 173-74 [Levinson, Respondingto Imperfection].
95.

Rawls, ibid at 239.

96. Ibid. at 233, 238.
97. Ibid. at 239.
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V)." As Samuel Freeman has noted, for Rawls, "[n]ot everything that the
people actually will in the exercise of their constituent power can count as a
valid amendment."" This, combined with Rawls's Lockean conception of
constituent power as only appearing after government is dissolved,' makes this
aspect of his approach puzzling: either constituent power appears every time
Article V is used (which would run counter to the distinction between the
constituted power of constitutional reform and constituent power),"' or it
only appears after government is dissolved (which would mean that constituent power is not exercised through Article V, or that every time Article V is
used government dissolves).1 02

98. "We assume the idea of a dualist constitutional democracy found in John Locke: it distinguishes
that people's constituent power to form, ratify, and amend a constitution from the ordinary
power of legislators and executives in everyday politics." Ibid. at 405-06.
99.

Freeman, supra note 87 at 662. And this is true even when, according to Rawls in his response
to Habermas, "whether the modern liberties are incorporated into the constitution is a
matter to be decided by the constituent power of a democratic people, a familiar line of
constitutional doctrine stemming from George Lawson via Locke." Rawls, ibid. at 415. This
seems to suggest that for Rawls, even when constitution makers, in the exercise of constituent
power, determine whether the constitutional essentials will be protected, they cannot abolish
them later through the exercise of that same power (because any attempt to do so should be
struck down by the courts).

100. "[The] constituent power of the people ... sets up a framework to regulate ordinary power, and
it comes into play only when the existing regime has been dissolved." Rawls, ibid at 231.
101. Ibid at 231. One could understand Rawls as adopting the distinction made by some European
and Latin American constitutionalists between pouvoir constituantinstitud and pouvoir
constituantderivd. See e.g. Luis Sinchez Agesta, Principiosde Teoria Politica,7th ed. (Madrid:
Editora Nacional, 1983) at 333-34; Luis Sinchez Agesta, Lecciones de DerechoPolitico, 6th
ed. (Granada: Libreria Pietro, 1959) at 384-86. Pouvoir constituantinstitud is the power to
create a new constitution, whereas pouvoir constituantderivi is the power to change it
through the amendment procedure. However, what this distinction does is assign the term
pouvoir constituantderivi to the ordinary power of altering the constitution through the legal
procedures provided by it (by definition a constituted power), and it does not change in any
way the fundamental distinction between acts of constituent power and acts of constitutional
reform.
102. I do not consider here the possibility of amending the US Constitution through a convention
called by two-thirds of the state legislatures and ratified by three-fourths of said legislatures,
as this method has never been used and there is no indication that Rawls was referring to it
when writing about Article V. For a discussion, see Levinson, UndemocraticConstitution,
supra note 11.
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Schmitt is much clearer in this respect. For him, the power to reform the
constitution and the constituent power must never be identified with each
other, and the limits that apply to the former do not apply to the latter: the
subject of constituent power can create and destroy constitutions at will. On
this point I agree with Schmitt. Placing limits on the subject of constituent
power, the sovereign people, amounts to a negation of democracy at the level of
fundamental laws. Accordingly, the conception of constitutional reform and
democratic legitimacy that I present in this article is incompatible with the part
of Rawls's view that appears to hold that the constituent power is subject to
substantive limits found in the existing juridical order. Instead, it rests on the
idea (which follows from the very concept of constituent power) that these limits only apply to the ordinary institutions of government. In that sense, I adopt
Schmitt's conception, but with an important addition: an act of constituent
power must be understood in light of its connections to the democratic ideal.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ACTS OF THE PEOPLE
The objective of this part of the article is to show how the doctrine of implicit
limits provides a way of understanding the requirements of democratic legitimacy in the context of constitutional reform. A problem seems to emerge here.
If the doctrine of implicit limits is about certain constitutional provisions that
cannot be changed, and democratic legitimacy requires that everything in a
constitution be open to change, this doctrine seems to run counter to the argument presented in this article. Nevertheless, what the doctrine of implicit
limits does (at least, the conception of the doctrine favoured here) is to point
toward a distinction between fundamental and ordinary constitutional change,
placing the former in the exclusive hands of the constituent subject and making
obvious the distinction between constitutional reform and the exercise of constituent power. Thus, if constituent power is understood in terms of its connections to the democratic ideal, the doctrine provides additional footing to the
argument that fundamental constitutional change should only result from a
participatory and open process.
Moreover (and this follows from the last point), the idea of implicit limits,
when looked at from the theory of constituent power, suggests that there must
be a correlation between the substance of an amendment and the procedure
used for its adoption. The more fundamental the change, the more participa-
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tory and open the amendment process should be.'" The correlation, however,
is not based on making the procedures for important transformations difficult
or impossible, but in making them more democratic. This does not mean that
non-fundamental changes cannot (or should not) be adopted through participatory procedures, but that the most participatory procedures are demanded by
the idea of democratic legitimacy only in the context of fundamental changes.
The doctrine of implicit limits to constitutional reform, in its traditional formulation, is in a way a reflection of liberal constitutionalism's discomfort
with constitutional change (particularly popular constitutional change), a fear
of giving citizens the power of altering the most fundamental principles of a
juridical order. Nevertheless, my intention here is to adopt the underlying
theoretical premise of this doctrine-the distinction between constituent
power and constitutional reform-and use it against this discomfort with
popular constitutional change.o' Under my approach, the fear of the constitutionalist-the ever-present possibility of popular meddling with the fundamental laws'os-becomes an essential component of a democratically
legitimate constitutional regime.

103. As this shows, procedure and substance are not always easily separable: it is precisely
because of the substance of the amendment that a special procedure is required. See
William F. Harris 1I, The InterpretableConstitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993) at 175.
104. On the discomfort with democracy, see Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should Legal
Analysis Become? (London: Verso, 1996). See also Jacques Rancibre, Hatred ofDemocracy
(London: Verso, 2006).
105. According to many contemporary constitutional theorists, a liberal constitution is always in
flux-a "living tree" that is always changing. See e.g. W.J. Waluchow, A Common Law
Theory offudicialReview: The Living Tree (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
These kinds of changes have a limited democratic potential. To begin with, they tend to be
gradual in nature, and there are certain things that would be very hard to do through
constitutional interpretation. (Think, for example, of replacing bicameralism with
unicameralism, or the other way around, through interpretation.) A similar point has been
raised by Levinson, Undemocratic Constitution,supra note 11 at 160. But regardless of the
limits of constitutional interpretation as a means to important constitutional transformations,
the main problem with such an approach is its lack of democratic credentials. Interpretation
is usually done by judges, and democratic constitutional change (which is the kind of change
that interests me here) must take place through procedures in which popular majorities
assume a central role.
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A. CITIZENS AND IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS
Even if one were to agree with Schmitt and Rawls and accept the idea that certain modifications are out of the scope of the ordinary power of amendment,
important questions remain. What counts as a fundamental constitutional
change? How are we to distinguish between fundamental and ordinary constitutional principles or clauses? These questions are important to my argument
because, as seen earlier, I believe that only fundamental constitutional transformations must take place through a process that amounts to an exercise of
constituent power-in other words, through.a process that attempts to replicate
a democratic constitution-making episode. In distinguishing between the fundamental and non-fundamental, one option would be to return to Schmitt and
Rawls. The former stressed those constitutional clauses that reflected a decision
of the constituent subject regarding its mode of political existence, such as the
adoption of a "democratic form of government," federalism, the decision in favour of parliamentarism or presidentialism, and the amendment formula itself.
Rawls also considered fundamental the basic structure of government (including
the scope and limits of majority rule as a decision-making method), as well as
basic liberal rights and liberties (including the protections of the rule of law).
While Schmitt and Rawls provide a good indication of the kind of provisions that would be considered fundamental in most contemporary societies,
the distinction is highly dependent on a society's history and political culture
and thus will vary from country to country.'O' In Canada, for example, as early
as 1927, Ernest Lapointe proposed a formula for the amending of the constitution according to which "ordinary amendments" could be adopted by parliament
with the consent of a majority of the provinces. For "fundamental amendments"-that is, those involving questions of provincial rights, the rights of
minorities, or rights affecting "race, language and creed"-the unanimous consent of the provinces would have been required."o' The current amendment
formula, adopted in 1982, rests on similar distinctions. Under the current for106. In his study of Article V of the US Constitution, Lester B. Orfield provided a list of more
than 25 topics that had been identified as outside the scope of the amending power by
different authors and lawyers during the first part of the twentieth century in the United
States (e.g., the establishment of a monarchy, the creation of nobility titles, and an
amendment creating special taxes for certain states). See Lester B. Orfield, The Amending of
the FederalConstitution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942) at 87-88, n. 12.
107. See Russell, ConstitutionalOdyssey, supra note 1 at 5 5-56.
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mula, changes touching issues related to the national languages, the monarchy
(e.g., the offices of the queen and the governor general), provincial representation in parliament, the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as
amendments to that part of the amendment rule, require provincial unanimity
(as well as approval by the two houses of the national legislature).108 Even
within specific countries, however, the fundamental or non-fundamental character of constitutional provisions is not static, but may be in a permanent state
of flux: what is considered fundamental in a particular historical context might
not be so considered at another time."
Now, while different societies will produce and assume different conceptions of the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental constitutional change, the rights and institutions (whatever specific form they take) that
are necessary for the exercise of constituent power present a special case. They
are necessary for the very existence of democracy, as they are constitutive of the
ability of the citizenry to put into question any principle(s) of the constitutional
regime. As such, they should only be altered or abolished through an exercise of
constituent power: only citizens can deprive themselves of their sovereignty, and
in that very act deprive their constitutional regime of democratic legitimacy. As
this (rather extreme) example shows, the fact that certain institutions and principles are out of the scope of the ordinary amendment process does not mean
that they are unchangeable. It just means that they must be changed through an
exercise of constituent power.
B. DOING AWAY WITH CONSTITUENT POWER
As we have seen, the idea of having a special procedure in place for fundamental
constitutional change is not alien to actual constitutional practice. But the fact
that a constitution establishes special procedures for certain types of amendments does not necessarily mean that these "special procedures" seek to increase

108. ConstitutionAct, 1982, s. 41(a)-(e), being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. See also Constitution of Venezuela, 1999, which establishes a different set of procedures
for "amendments," "reforms," and for the transformation of the state or the adoption of a
new constitution. Supra note 57, arts. 340, 343, 347.
109. Who is to determine what is fundamental and what is not? One alternative would be to leave
that task to the judiciary, which would be responsible for determining what kind of
constitutional change can be made by the ordinary amendment process and what requires a
more participatory procedure, such as the convocation of a constituent assembly.
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opportunities for popular participation. For instance, the Spanish Constitution
establishes two different mechanisms for constitutional change."' The first procedure, outlined in Article 167, requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of
each of the houses of parliament. This procedure, which Spanish constitutional
theory calls "general,"'" requires a referendum if requested by a tenth of the
members of either of the houses. However, the procedure cannot be used for
the total revision of the constitution, or a partialrevision that affects basic constitutional principles and fundamental rights. In order to reform such provisions, one must utilize the "exceptional""' procedure established in Article 168,
which not only requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of each house, but the
immediate dissolution of parliament and the calling of general elections."
The new parliament must approve, again by two-thirds, the proposed changes,
and the modifications must be submitted to the electorate in a referendum.
The emphasis in the Spanish Constitution seems to be (as is also the case of
the Canadian one with respect to changes that require provincial unanimity)
not so much in making the process leading to important transformations more
participatory (unless one sees the ideal of popular participation exhausted in a
referendum),"' but in making it more difficult. In fact, the process established
in Article 168 of the Spanish Constitution seems to have the purpose of making
fundamental transformations nearly impossible. As I already stated, my approach
does not seek to make the adoption of fundamental changes more difficult or
unlikely, but more democratic. The idea is not that a legislature should be able
to adopt these types of changes easily (as in a flexible constitution), but that
there should be procedures in place that allow citizens to become protagonists
of important constitutional changes. In other words, it would not mean much
if a constitutional regime required that important transformations be effected
through "democratic" mechanisms if these mechanisms were very difficult or
impossible to activate. The constitutional regime must possess a true escape
valve for the constituent power, not merely recognize that it continues to exist
110. Constitucidn espafiola de 1978 (Constitution ofSpain, 1978), arts. 167, 168 [Constitutionof
Spain, 1978].
S11l.De Vega, supra note 66 at 143.
112. Ibid.
113. Constitution ofSpain, 1978, supra note 110, art. 168.
114. The limits of the referendum as a mechanism of popular participation will be briefly
discussed in Part IV, below.
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after the constitution is in effect, while at the same time "doing away" with it.
Democratic constitutional change would not mean much if there was no way
for constituent power to manifest itself in actual political practice.
There are at least four methods of "doing away" with constituent power:
(1) mystifying constituent power, (2) displacing constituent power, (3) legalizing constituent power, and (4) hiding constituent power. The mystification of
constituent power can easily coexist with the other three methods. The idea is
to recognize (at the level of constitutional discourse) the people's power to adopt
a new or radically modified constitution, but without providing any institutional
means for this power to be exercised. This seems to be the most common approach: while most constitutionalists and politicians would agree that the people have an unlimited power to recreate their juridical order, they generally
abstain from proposing mechanisms that would allow something that resembles the exercise of that power to take place."' The displacement of constituent power by ordinary government takes place in countries which, like the
United Kingdom, have an unwritten (or partially unwritten) constitution and
operate under the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Here, there is an almost complete identification of "parliament" and "people"; the former appears
as a constituent assembly in a potentially permanent session,"'6 and the latter
rarely makes an appearance other than voting in regular elections.'1

115. See e.g. Murphy, ConstitutionalDemocracy, supra note 11. This problem is also exemplified
in the judicial decisions that adopt the doctrine of implicit limits to constitutional reform.
These decisions usually stress the idea that even when the ordinary institutions of government
cannot make certain changes, the people, in the exercise of their constituent power, can make
any change they want, even when there is no institutional mechanism in place for this to
occur. See e.g. the Indian case of Golaknath v. Punjab,A.I.R. 1967 SC 1643.
116. For a discussion of the idea that the Westminster Parliament is a constituent assembly in
permanent session, see Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Richard D. Heffner, ed.
(New York: New American Library, 1956) at 74.
117. For a famous formulation of the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, see A.V. Dicey,
Introduction to the Study ofthe Law ofthe Constitution (London: MacMillan, 1959). Although
Dicey rejected the distinction between higher and ordinary laws, and even accepted Alexis de
Tocqueville's characterization of the British Parliament as a constituent assembly in
permanent session (at 83), late in his life he supported the institution of the referendum in
the context of constitutional change. In so doing, he also defended a distinction between
parliament and "people" (or "nation"), describing the latter as the "true sovereign." A.V.
Dicey, "The Referendum" (1894) 23 Nat'l Rev. 65 at 70 (originally published under the
pseudonym "Farrer"). For an analysis, see Rivka Weill, "Dicey Was Not Diceyan" (2003) 62
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The legalization of constituent power is similar to its displacement, but occurs in the context of written constitutions. Under this kind of arrangement,
the power of amendment is also technically unlimited, but its procedural requirements are so easy to meet-often they only require a legislative majority,
as is the case with some types of amendments of the Indian Constitution-that
the amendment process becomes "equivalent" to the constituent power."' Contrast this with the hiding of constituent power, exemplified in rigid constitutions (that is, constitutions that are very difficult to amend, such as the US and
Canadian Constitutions)."" This type of constitution "buries" constituent
power under an amendment formula that can technically be used to change any
constitutional provision, but whose requirements are extremely difficult to
meet.120 Thus, the very existence of an "unlimited" power of constitutional reform makes an exercise of constituent power seem unnecessary and, at the same
time, the stringent requirements of the amendment procedure tend to prevent
important transformations from taking place.
In these four situations the result is the same: popular participation in constitutional reform is reduced to a minimum, and the modification of the fundamental laws becomes a difficult enterprise (as in constitutions that can be
amended only by legislative supermajorities, sometimes followed by ratification
in a referendum) or just a special kind of ordinary law making (as in a flexible
Cambridge L.J. 474. For a history and discussion of the identification of "parliament" and
"people" in British constitutionalism, see Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The
Rise ofPopularSovereignty in England andAmerica (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1988).
118. It is not surprising that through the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution the
Indian Parliament declared itself the subject of constituent power: "[n]otwithstanding
anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by
way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the
procedure laid down in this article." Constitution ofIndia, as modified up to the 1st December,
2007. In fact, the Supreme Court of India adopted the theory of implicit limits to
constitutional reform in order to control the power of amendment in a very flexible
constitution. See cases cited at supra note 70.
119. See Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment" in Levinson,
Responding to Imperfection, supra note 94, 237.
120. See Andreas Kalyvas, Book Review of Thdorie et Pratiquedu Pouvoir Constituantby Claude
Klein and Insurgencies: Constituent Powerand the Modern State by Antonio Negri, (2001) 8
Constellations 413 at 414.

COLON-RIOS. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE JURIDICAL

235

or unwritten constitution). A constitutional regime that does away with constituent power is inconsistent with the idea of democratic legitimacy. It is not
enough to have a constitution in which every single disposition can be changed
if the procedures for amendment are so stringent as to make any kind of modification highly unlikely. In the same way, it is not enough to have a constitution that can be easily amended if the ordinary legislature will do all the work
and highly participatory procedures are simply out of the equation. Democratic
openness requires an openness that can be accessed by the citizenry, one that
comes accompanied by opportunities for popular participation. In this respect, the
ideals of popular participation and democratic openness are radically intertwined,
and their separation sometimes becomes unstable. To be democratically legitimate, a constitutional regime must not mystify, displace, legalize, or hide constituent power; on the contrary, it must provide a real possibility for its exercise.

IV. DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
As briefly suggested in Part III, above, democratic constitutional change is not
equivalent to the use of a popular referendum for the ratification of the constitutional changes proposed by the legislature. From a democratic perspective this
is simply insufficient; in my view, the widespread assumption that a referendum
is an expression of the ultimate sovereignty of the people is mistaken.'21 In the
context of constitutional reform, a constitutionally mandated referendum is
nothing but a juridical exercise required by the amendment procedure itself:
when citizens express their support or reject a constitutional amendment, they
exercise constituted, rather than constituent, power. As Pedro de Vega argues, a
constitutional referendum "does not have the objective of legitimating constitutional change through an act of the sovereign people,"' 22 but of making change
more difficult. For de Vega, the constitutional referendum is part of the system
of checks and balances typical of the constitutional state, not a device for the
121. Consider, for example, the following statement by Pierre Trudeau, upon the announcement
that nine Canadian provinces (Quebec excepted) reached an agreement regarding the
patriation of the constitution and the adoption of an amendment formula: "I have only one
regret. I put it on record. I will not return to it. I have the regret that we have not kept in the
amending formula a reference to the ultimate sovereignty of the people as could be tested in
a referendum." Cited in Graham Fraser, Rend Livesque and the Parti Quibicoisin Power
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) at 298.
122. De Vega, supra note 66 at 302.
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exercise of constituent power. When one examines the institution of the constitutional referendum from a democratic perspective, it is easy to see why de
Vega's point should be taken seriously. The main problem is this: a constitutional referendum, by itself, cannot satisfy the ideals of democratic openness
and popular participation.
A referendum presents citizens with a set of pre-designed alternatives that
they cannot change; it does not necessarily allow citizens to put into question
and deliberate about different constitutional provisions, much less about the
constitutional regime as a whole. Dietrich Conrad expressed this clearly when
he wrote that the value of a constitutional referendum is dubious, since it must
be restricted "to a few questions to be answered yes or no, [and] since it does
not give the people an active part in molding constitutional details and is, at its
best, more in the nature of an ultimate veto power."123 Moreover, if citizens are
asked to vote on a set of disparate and complex proposals, the referendum can
easily turn into a mere "plebiscitary" exercise in which voters simply express
their support or dislike of current government officials, particularly of the executive. A referendum does not guarantee the degree of deliberation and debate
necessary for the maximization of the ideal of popular participation either: citizens do not become authors of their amended constitution, but merely "consent" to the proposed changes. A democratic process of constitutional change
mandates a degree of openness and participation similar to that present in a
(democratic) constitution-making episode.
A. OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES AND POPULAR INITIATIVES
The democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime, I have argued, depends
on its susceptibility to democratic re-constitution. This susceptibility is far from
being exhausted in the recognition of basic political rights. Beyond allowing
citizens to associate with each other and express their political opinions freely, a
constitutional regime must have some institutional mechanism(s) in place (in
addition to the ordinary amendment procedure) designed to allow citizens to
propose and decide on fundamental constitutional changes. There is no single
or correct set of arrangements that must be adopted in order to meet the de-

123. Conrad, supra note 81 at 405.
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mands of democratic legitimacy. Their basic feature, of course, must be the facilitation of the exercise of constituent power through a participatory and open
procedure. My objective here, therefore, is not to provide a list of the institutional mechanisms necessary for the realization of democracy at the level of the
fundamental laws, but to give examples of the kind of arrangements that would
meet the demands of democratic legitimacy. There are at least two modes of
amendment consistent with a democratically legitimate constitutional regime:
(1) the constituent assembly convened by the legislature, and (2) the constituent
assembly convened from below.12 ' These mechanisms do not exclude each other
and, as we will see, they are more or less present in the national constitutions of
several countries.
1. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY CONVENED BY THE LEGISLATURE
The first of these mechanisms is the most common of all. It consists of a constituent assembly composed of delegates elected for the sole purpose of engaging in the re-constitution of the juridical order, and is convened by ordinary
124. Both of these mechanisms involve a voting procedure. In the case of constituent assemblies, a
referendum must take place in order for them to be convened and another to ratify their
proposals. Moreover, the approval of the changes by the assembly requires an internal voting
procedure. These voting procedures, in my view, should be based on the principle of
majority rule. There are at least four reasons for this. First, it must be stressed that we are not
talking about a legislature making changes in a constitution as if it were an ordinary law: the
voters here are the citizens themselves or their delegates to a constituent assembly, who enjoy
a higher degree of legitimacy than ordinary legislators. Second, majority rule (unlike
supermajoriry rule or unanimity) is consistent with the ideal of political equality among
citizens and at the same time (unlike the tossing of a coin) is sensitive to the actual preferences
of the majority of voters. Third, majority rule is more consistent with the very idea of the
democratic legitimacy of a constitutional regime than any other voting method. That is,
because citizens usually live under a constitution in whose creation they did not participate, a
voting rule more demanding than the rule of the majority would offend the principle of
popular sovereignty (understood as the constituent power of the people). Finally, in the case
of the internal voting procedures of a constituent assembly that is drafting a whole new
constitution, it guarantees that a decision will be produced. Once a constituent assembly is
convened with the objective of drafting a new constitution, a lack of success in producing a
new fundamental law could have severe political consequences, as the old constitutional
regime is likely to suffer from an important defect or deficit of political legitimacy (which
probably was the reason why the constituent assembly was convened in the first place).
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government (usually by the legislature).125 Because it is convened by government
and not by the people, this kind of assembly guarantees only the most minimal
degree of democratic legitimacy: the mere possibility of constitutional re-making
through an extraordinary and elected body. The fact that this modality of the
constituent assembly is convened by the ordinary legislature comes accompanied by at least two major difficulties. First, it would allow a legislature that
wants to alter the constitution in order to increase its own powers to convene a
constituent assembly in the absence of popular support. Second, it would give
the ordinary institutions of government the key to opening the door for important constitutional transformations. That is, the legislature could reject a popular claim for a constituent assembly, even in times of heightened popular
mobilization.
The first of these concerns can be diminished by a requirement that the
electorate ratify the legislature's proposal for a constituent assembly in a referendum. To guarantee that the referendum evidences considerable popular sup125. In Canada, there have been, at different moments, calls for a constituent assembly. See e.g.
Philip Resnick, Toward a Canada-Quebec Union (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1991); Constitutional Task Force on the Future of Canada, Citizens and Government:
Who Decides? (Calgary: Canada West Foundation, 1991). It is also significant that the
Beaudoin-Edwards Committee reported that the constituent assembly was "[b]y far the most
commonly suggested alternative to executive federalism" in the course of its hearings. The
ProcessforAmending the Constitution of Canada: The Report of the SpecialJoint Committee of
the Senate and the House of Commons (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1991) at 43.
There have also been calls for an "appointed" constituent assembly. Under this type of
proposal, the assembly would complement the existent amending procedure, and serve only
as a "negotiating instrument." See Peter Russell, "Towards a New Constitutional Process" in
Ronald L. Watts & Douglas M. Brown, eds., Optionsfor a New Canada(Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1991) 141 at 150-51. See also Clyde Wells, "Reforming the
Amending Formula: The Case for a Constitutional Convention" (1991) 2 Const. Forum
Const. 69; Fiddration des Francophones Hors Quebec, Resolving the Impasse: The Needfor a
ConstituentAssembly (Briefpresentedby the Fidirationdes Francophoneshors Quebec to the
SpecialJoint committee on the ProcessforAmending the Constitutionof Canada) (Ottawa:
F6ddration des Francophones Hors Quebec, 1991). There were also several studies published
in Canada regarding the idea of a constituent assembly from a comparative perspective. See
e.g. Patrick Monahan, Lynda Covello & Jonathan Batty, ConstituentAssemblies: The
CanadianDebate in ComparativeandHistoricalContext (North York: York University
Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, 1992); Patrick Fafard & Darrel R. Reid,
ConstituentAssemblies: A ComparativeSurvey (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, 1991).
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port for important constitutional change, there could be a requirement of participation (e.g., 75 per cent of the citizens that voted in the previous election
must vote in the referendum or it would have no legal effect). The second concern is more difficult to address, and this is why this modality of the constituent
assembly guarantees only a minimal degree of democratic legitimacy: it might
simply result in the prettification of the constitutional order and the hiding of
constituent power behind a procedure that-although available-will never be
used. The potential and the limits of this kind of mechanism, therefore, will
greatly depend on the political culture of the country in question and the democratic responsiveness of its ordinary political institutions.
This mechanism also has certain advantages. The fact that the initiative to
26
convene the constituent assembly lies within the exclusive jurisdictionl of the
legislature might contribute to the development of different forms of informal
political actions, such as popular demonstrations, civil disobedience, and other
types of protests, and rally large parts of the population around the need for
constitutional change.127 In other words, it provides an opportunity for citizens
to use non-institutional methods to draw public attention to what they think
are necessary changes to the laws that regulate their association and push for a
public dialogue that could end in the convocation of a constituent assembly by
the legislature. At the same time, it gives lawyers and philosophers the opportunity, as active citizens (not as experts to whom the rest should defer), to convince
majorities of what they think are (or are not) necessary constitutional changes.
An example of this kind of mechanism can be found in Article 376 of the
Colombian Constitution.'28 The constituent assembly that drafted the 1991
constitution was convened informally, in an express confrontation with the
constitutional regime (in the sense that the old constitution did not contemplate
that mechanism). Not surprisingly, the assembly inserted into the new constitution a provision that expressly authorizes the legislature to convene a constituent assembly. As the Colombian Constitutional Court stated in 2003, by
inserting this provision the assembly attempted to allow for the possibility of the
126. As we will see in Part IV(A)(2), below, there is no need for a legislature to have the exclusive
jurisdiction to convene a constituent assembly.
127. Naturally, these activities will only be possible if basic political rights are respected. This is an
example of the direct connection between basic political rights and democratic legitimacy.
128. Repiblica de Colombia de 1991 con reformas hasta 2005 (Republic of Colombia Constitution of
1991 through 2005 reforms), art. 376 [Colombian Constitution, 1991).
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future exercise of constituent power, thus creating an opening that the previous
constitution lacked. 129 Nevertheless, since the adoption of the 1991 constitution,
no constituent assembly has been convened. Of course, this is not necessarily a
problem and could, in fact, be a sign of a constitutional regime that is working
well. However, this is not the case, as, since 1991, the Colombian Constitution
has been the object of controversial changes adopted through an amendment
process (the ordinary amendment process) in which the executive and the legislature have played the central role.
2. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY CONVENED FROM BELOW
The constituent assembly convened "from below," triggered at the initiative of
the citizenry as opposed to that of the legislature, is a superior mechanism from
the perspective of democratic legitimacy. It attributes to the people (as the
mythical, extra-legal founder of the constitution)'13 the faculty of re-activating
its constituent power and becoming the author of a radically transformed constitutional regime. This mechanism is about recognizing a power superior to
the constitution and giving citizens, acting outside the ordinary institutions of
government, the institutional means to exercise it.
The convocation of such an assembly could be initiated by the collection of
a number of signatures that could range from 15 to 20 per cent of the electorate.13 ' After the required number of signatures is collected, a referendum would
129. Constitutional Court of Columbia, Sentencia C-551-03 at para. 40. For a discussion of
whether a constituent assembly convened according to the existing constitutional text can be
considered a true act of constituent power, see Gonzalo Ramirez Cleves, Limites a la Reforma
Constitucionalen Colombia:El Concepto de Consticucidn como Fundamento de la Restriccidn
(Bogotd: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2005) at 454-55. According to Ramirez
Cleves, a constituent assembly can be said to be exercising constituent power, and not the
mere power of constitutional reform, when three conditions are satisfied: (1) a constituent
assembly is given the power to transform the constitution in any way (a general delegation of
powers), (2) a great majority of the population votes in favour of convening the assembly in a
referendum, and (3) there seems to be a general consensus about creating a new
constitutional regime.
130. Mythical because, in practice, most constitutions are not adopted democratically and people
are usually born into an already constituted constitutional regime.
131. The idea here is not to set the threshold so high as to make the triggering of the constituent
assembly impossible, but at the same time not to set it so low that a minority not having the
support of large sections of the population (but perhaps plenty of economic resources) can
easily initiate a process of constitutional reform. The few constitutions that allow for the
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take place in which the entire citizenry would have the opportunity to decide
whether the assembly is to be convened. If the majority votes in the affirmative
(as in the previous type of assembly, there could be a requirement of minimum
participation), the election of delegates would take place. From then on, the
assembly would deliberate as a sovereign body, independent of the ordinary (or
constituted) powers of government and would operate according to its own
rules. It would be authorized to replace the existing constitutional regime and
create an entirely new one. Its proposals, however, would have to be ratified
by the electorate in an additional referendum in order to enter into effect. This
is in fact the way in which the constitutions of Venezuela,132 Ecuador," and
Bolivia"' conceive of this extraordinary body. The case of the Bolivian Constitution is the most interesting (at least from the perspective of the argument presented in this article), as it not only attributes to ordinary citizens the power to
convene a constituent assembly, but-in Schmittian fashion-specifically states
that fundamental constitutional transformations must be adopted through this
kind of body:
[t]he total reform of the Constitution, or those modifications that affect its fundamental principles, its recognized rights, duties, and guarantees, or the supremacy
of the constitution and the process of constitutional reform, will take place
through a sovereign Constituent Assembly, activated by popular will through a
referendum. The referendum will be triggered by popular initiative, by the signatures of at least twenty percent of the electorate; by the Plurinational Legislative
Assembly; or by the President of the State. The Constituent Assembly will autoregulate itself in all matters. The enterin into force of the reform will require
3
popular ratification through referendum.

convocation of a constituent assembly "from below" require 12-20 per cent of the signatures
of registered electors (Ecuador: 12 per cent, Venezuela: 15 per cent, Bolivia: 20 per cent).
132. Constitutionof Venezuela, 1999, supra note 57, arts. 347, 348. In the case of the Venezuelan
Constitution (Article 348), it is not clear if a referendum is required to convene the assembly
or if the collection of signatures (15 per cent of the electors) is all that is needed. A literal
reading of the text certainly suggests the latter, but such reading would likely be rejected in
practice. Interestingly, the set of constitutional reforms recently rejected by the electorate
included an amendment that would have increased the number of signatures required from
15 per cent to 30 per cent.
133. Reptiblica del Ecuador Constitucionesde 2008 (Republic ofEcuador Constitutionof2008), art.
444.
134. Constitucidn de la Reptiblica de Bolivia de 2009 (Republic of Bolivia Constitutionof 2009).
135. Ibid., art. 408.
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A constituent assembly, when triggered by the citizens themselves, would
facilitate the exercise of constituent power and come very close to embodying
the ideals of democratic openness and popular participation. On the one hand,
a constituent assembly, as repository of the constituent power, has no limits to
its competencies and can make any change in the constitutional regime, no
matter how fundamental.' It can even result in the abolition of democracy and
in the alteration of the very amendment formula that provides for its convocation, although if it does, it would destroy its very democratic legitimacy together
with that of the constitutional regime.' On the other hand, and unlike the
constituent assembly convened exclusively by the legislature, it recognizes the
citizenry as the protagonist of important constitutional transformations from
the beginning to the end of the process. For it to be a truly open and participatory mechanism, the onus that must be met in order to activate the process that
could lead to a constituent assembly should not be too high. The collection of
the signatures of less than a fifth of the registered electors seems reasonable in
this respect-this is, in fact, the kind of burden established in the constitutions
that contain this mechanism. After the initial stage of the process begins, the
electorate can reject the convocation of the constituent assembly by a simple
majority in a referendum, but the public discussion about the future of the constitutional regime that can take place around these exercises is in itself a valuable democratic event.

136. The sovereign nature of the constituent assembly seemed to have been taken quite seriously
in the countries mentioned above. For instance, it was considered necessary that, once
convened, the assemblies issued a decree ratifying the legitimacy of those individuals already
in office (including the president), as a way of asserting its (constituent) power to remove
and replace those currently exercising constituted power. This does not mean, however, that
a constituent assembly cannot impose limits on itself (such as specific voting rules) or on its
delegates. For example, the French Constituent Assembly adopted a rule proposed by
Robespierre according to which the members of the assembly were banned from entering the
first ordinary legislative assembly elected under the new constitution. See Andrew Arato,
"Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy" (1995) 17 Cardozo L. Rev.
191 at 227; Jon Elster, "Legislatures as Constituent Assembles" in Richard W. Bauman &
Tsvi Kahana, eds., The Least ExaminedBranch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 181 at 192. A similar rule was adopted
by the Colombian National Constituent Assembly of 1991. See Colombian Constitution,
1991, supra note 128, art. 2, "Transitory Provisions."
137. For a provision apparently intended to prevent this, see Constitution of Venezuela, supra note
57. art. 350.
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A constitutional regime that grants the citizenry the power to convene a
constituent assembly, even against the will of government officials, would certainly have a stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than a system that leaves
amendments in the hands of the ordinary political institutions. The mechanism
combines institutions of direct (collection of signatures, referendums) and representative (the assembly) democracy; of all the other methods of constitutional
change, it has the better chance of maximizing popular participation. Of course,
this type of mechanism is not likely to be used frequently and has never been
used in the few constitutional regimes that recognize it.13 8 In fact, frequent resort to the convocation of a constituent assembly (in any of its variants), instead
of being a symptom of an active and lively democracy, could be an indication
of a profound political problem. What democratic legitimacy requires is not a
constitutional regime that is constantly altered in fundamental ways through
highly participatory procedures, but one that can be altered in that way.

V. CONCLUSION
This article addressed the question of what it means for a constitutional regime
to be susceptible to democratic re-constitution and therefore to enjoy democratic legitimacy. Re-constitution here does not merely mean "constitutional
change," but a type of constitutional change that, because of its fundamental
character, should come accompanied by intense levels of popular participation
and democratic openness. Democratic re-constitution involves an exercise of
constituent power, an activation of the faculty of citizens to alter the fundamental laws under which they live through extraordinary mechanisms. Only a
constitutional regime that is open to this kind of transformation, I have argued,
can be considered legitimate from a democratic perspective, and even one that
did not originate in a democratic constitution-making episode can enjoy democratic legitimacy if it is susceptible to re-constitution. In most modern states,
the adoption of the mechanisms that make this possible would itself involve an
138. It is ironic that these types of mechanisms are beginning to appear not in the fundamental
laws of established Western democracies, but in the new constitutions of Latin America.
Nevertheless, a group of citizens in California have recently presented initiatives (labelled by
some as verging "on the radical") with the objective of calling the first constitutional
convention in that state in over a century. See Jennifer Steinhauer, "Ballot Issues Attest to
Anger in California" The New York Times (10 January 2010), online: <http://www.nytimes.
com/20 10/01/1 0/us/ 10calif.html>.
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important constitutional overhaul, amounting to a change in the balance of
power that would take away from the legislature the exclusive jurisdiction to
alter the constitution.
I have also maintained that, for a constitutional regime to meet the demands
of democratic legitimacy, it should distinguish between ordinary and fundamental constitutional change. In the absence of such a distinction, every single
change in the constitution would require a degree of mobilization that would
trivialize constituent power and/or make constitutional change as remote and
infrequent as the founding of a new state. If these democratic processes were
simply made parallel to the ordinary amendment procedure-that is, if the
people and the legislature were granted the same powers with regard to the constitutional text-the former's constituent power would become indistinguishable
from a constituted power, with all that implies in terms of democracy. That is,
not only would the ordinary legislature become a sort of constituent assembly
in a potentially permanent session, duplicating the people as the subject of constituent power, but it would have the power to abolish the institutions that allow for the very possibility of democratic re-constitution. To say that a
constitutional regime must be susceptible to democratic re-constitution to
enjoy democratic legitimacy, is therefore to say as well that an exercise of constituent power is the only kind of re-constitution acceptable from a democratic perspective.
The mechanisms considered in Part IV, above, are examples of institutions
that facilitate democratic constitutional change, reveal that a democratically legitimate constitutional regime is possible, and demonstrate that constituent
power does not have to be a one-time event nor relegated to the occurrence of a
political revolution. While the modalities of the constituent assembly discussed
in the article can be used as means for the exercise of constituent power, they
have an interesting relationship with legality: they cannot be easily classified as
legal or extra-legal. That is, because they are engaged in constituent activity,
they seem to belong to the political, rather than to the juridical, terrain. They
address the constitutional regime from the outside, and after they are convened,
they are not bound by any form of positive law."' At the same time, they are
139. Because a constituent assembly is generally understood as a means for the exercise of
constituent power, its proposals for change are not normally subject to judicial review,
regardless of their content. However, as noted above, their validity usually depends on their
ratification in a referendum. For unusual cases of a constitutional court reviewing the
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not exactly extra-legal (or even illegal), as they emerge from the very fundamental laws they seek to transform.
This, however, should not come as a surprise, as both democracy and constituent power are characterized by a political terrain that is never closed and a
constitution that is never finished. Democratic legitimacy cannot be granted by
well-conceived or well-intentioned constitutional forms, but arises from popular political practices that threaten to question the most fundamental principles
of the constitutional regime. That constituent power has been ignored by Anglo-American constitutional theory is unfortunate but understandable: if its
importance were recognized, most constitutional regimes would be seen as suffering from an important deficit of democratic legitimacy. And the history of
constitutional theory is a history of finding ways of defending the democratic
legitimacy of constitutional regimes, not of putting their legitimacy into doubt.

decisions of a constitution-making body, see In re Certificationofthe Constitution ofthe
Republic of South Africa, 1996, (4) SA 744 (C.C.); In re Certificationof the Amendment text of
the Constitution ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa, 1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (C.C.).

